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Overview
§ This study explores the role of
demographics and its influence on an
individual’s beliefs for conspiracy theories
in the United States
§ Research Focuses On:
§ Examining if the same demographics
predictors are applicable and
implemented for multiple conspiracy
theories
§ Conspiracy theories focused on are
JFK’s assassination and 9/11 attacks
§ Applying previously researched
predictors to the focuses conspiracy
theories
§ Using the Chapman Survey of
American Fears

Abstract
The lack of trust and transparency between many
American citizens and the United States
government. Conspiracy theories have been used
throughout history as an explanation for events
and situations that were carried out by the
government without any credible evidence.
However who believes in them? Using Chapman
University Survey of American Fears, this paper
will explore the predictors of beliefs in conspiracy
theories, who believes in which theories, and
whether certain theories are believed over others.
The predictors being explored are age, ideology,
the fear of financial uncertainty, education, and the
media. In the case of this paper, the conspiracy
theories being covered are John F. Kennedy’s
assassination and the 9/11 attacks. Additionally,
there’s a conception that those believing in
conspiracy theories tend to be older citizens
however, recently conspiracy theories have
become a trending topic among the youth due to
popular YouTubers such as Shane Dawson and
Buzzfeed’s Unsolved. This is important because
one could begin to see a possible shift in those
who believe in conspiracy theories. If the research
display an association between the predictors and
conspiracy theories, it will allow us to understand
who believes in theories and which one they
believe in. The expected result for a John F.
Kennedy assassination conspiracy believer is over
the age of 65, conservative leaning, with limited
education, constant viewer of Fox News, and does
not fear financial uncertainty. Whereas the 9/11
attacks conspiracy believer is younger, liberal
leaning, achieve higher education, constant viewer
of social media, and fears financial uncertainty.

Findings

Hypotheses:
H1: Having stronger partisan beliefs are more likely to believe in conspiracy theories
a. Having the fear of financial uncertainty in the future are more likely to believe in conspiracy theories
H2: Those who are less educated and younger are more likely to believe in conspiracy theories
H3: Those who have a higher usage of social media for news information are more likely to believe in conspiracy theories
.

Data
H1: Partisanship and Financial Uncertainty

H3: Media

H2: Education and Age
Education and age are both predictors for
conspiracy theories, The less educated and younger
aged are more likely to believe in conspiracy
theories. However, for the belief in JFK’s
assassination theory, the coefficient beta for age is
very weak therefore, it can indicate that regardless of
one’s generation, the theory is passed on from one
generation to another.

A note on the independent variable above: Rnq6 is
the result of recoding the question on partisanship.
Originally on a 7-point scale, the question asked, “Do
you think of yourself as Republican, Democrat, or
Independent?”, 1=strong Republican and 7=strong
democrat. Rqn6 is recoded to having a 3-point scale.
The results of the regression test indicates that the
relationship between partisanship and the theory is
not statistically significant with p<.255. However, the
regression test does indicate the relationship
between financial uncertainty and JFK’s
assassination is statistically significant with a p<.000.
That said, financial uncertainty has a magnitude of β
= -.149 in the conspiracy theory of JFK’s
assassination. Furthermore, the R Square of this test
is .023 indicating only 2.3% of the relationship
between partisanship and fear of financial uncertainty
is explained by the data.
H2: Education and Age

The results of this regression test indicates the
relationship between age, education and JFK’s
assassination theory are statistically significant with
both independent variables having p<.003 and
p<.009. The magnitude of the relationship for the
independent variable of education is represented by
.085. In contrast, the magnitude of age is
represented by .076. That said, education has a
greater impact of influence as a predictor for belief in
JFK’s assassination theory. Moreover, the R Square
of this test is .013, in which only 1.3% of the
relationship between education and age is explained
by the data.

H1: Partisanship and Financial Uncertainty
Those with stronger partisan beliefs are not
more likely to believe in conspiracy theories. Any
level of partisanship does not influence one to
believe in conspiracy theories. However, greater fear
of financial uncertainty is a predictor of beliefs in
conspiracy theories. Financial uncertainty often
comes from one’s “lack of control” over things
therefore, believing in things such as conspiracy
theories help one feel empowered.

The results of this regression indicates the
relationship between three of the seven sources of
media and JFK’s assassination theory are
statistically significant. The three sources are
watching Fox News, watching local TV news to
learn about the area, and receiving news from
social media. The magnitude of the relationship for
the independent variable of receiving news from
social media is represented by -.105. That said, of
the three sources of receiving news information,
social media has the greatest impact as a predictor
for belief in JFK’s assassination. Furthermore, the R
Square is .034, in which only 3.4% of the media is
explained by the data.

H3: Media
Different sources of media have different
amount of impact of individuals for beliefs in
conspiracy theories. Receiving new information from
social media held the greatest impact for influence.
That said, higher usage of social media does not
make one more likely to believe in conspiracy
theories.

Conclusion
A solidified list of predictors for conspiracy theories
is hard to determine. Some predictors work well for
one theory while for a another is does not. The
predictors found for JFK’s assassination theory are
higher fear of financial uncertainty, less educated,
and moderate usage of receiving news information
from social media. On the other hand, the
predictors for the 9/11 attacks are fairly the same
however age and education have more influence.
Surprisingly, the predictor of partisanship was not
significant in either of the theories used in this
topic.
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